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Orrin G. Hatch*

Better Late Than Never:
Implementation Of The 1886

Berne Convention

Introduction
On October 31, 1988, President Reagan signed into law H.R. 4262, the
Berne Convention Implementation Act1 (hereinafter "Implementation
Act"), observing that:
With 77 countries as members, including most of our trading partners,
the Berne Convention features the highest internationally recognized
standards for the protection of works of authorship. Our membership
will automatically grant the United States copyright relations with 24 new
copycountries and will secure the highest available level of international
2
right protection of U.S. artists, authors, and copyright holders.
The President also explained the significance of this new enactment in
concrete economic terms:
The cost to Americans [of not joining the Berne Convention] has been
substantial not only in terms of the violation of the property rights of
Americans but in terms of our trade balance as well. We've been running
a trade surplus of over $1 billion annually in copyrighted goods, and it
would have been much larger had it not been for the pirating of American
copyright work. In 1986 alone, the entertainment industry may have lost
and software
more than $2 billion in potential revenue, and our computer
3
industries more than $4 billion in potential revenue.
These explanations 4 underscore the reasons that enactment of the
* U.S. Senator (R-Utah). Ranking minority member, Subcommittee on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
1. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-658, 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2853 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 116A) (previously H.R. 4262, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)).
2. Remarks on Signing the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 24
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1405 (Oct. 31, 1988).
3. Id. at 1406.

4. For further evidence on the economic benefits of Berne Convention acces-

sion, see The Berne Convention: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 70-77 (1988)

[hereinafter Hearings, 100th Cong.] (statement of Commerce Secretary C. William
22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 171 (1989)
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Implementation Act and the subsequent act of accession to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 5 (hereinafter "Convention" or "Berne") may well be this decade's most significant
advance for American intellectual property law.
The Convention is the oldest and most comprehensive international
treaty governing the protection of copyrights. It extends copyright protections beyond our borders to worldwide coverage provided by the 77
current signatories of the multilateral treaty, including 24 countries with
which the U.S. currently has no intellectual property agreements. 6
Moreover, U.S. adherence to Berne may well lead to incorporation of
stronger intellectual property protections in the General Agreement on
7
Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter "GATT").
Despite the evident benefits of Berne membership, the United
States waited more than 102 years to ratify the treaty. The primary reason for this delay was that U.S. copyright law had, for over a century,
been incompatible with the terms of the treaty.8 Evolving American law
and a diligent bi-partisan congressional effort, however, created a situation where the U.S. could accede to Berne. Enactment of the Implementation Act enabled the United States to take the formal steps to ratify the
Convention and join the Berne Union.
I.

Brief History Of U.S. Copyright Law and the Convention

A.

Early U.S. International Copyright Efforts
Although the United States adopted its first copyright protections in
17909 pursuant to Article I Section 8 of the Constitution,' 0 Congress
initially provided no protection for works by foreign authors. In fact,
this original copyright law specifically excluded foreign authors from its
coverage:
... nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit the importation or
rendering, reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any map,
chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person not a
Verity) ("In 1984, [foreign piracy of U.S. copyrighted materials] cost U.S. industries
more than $1.3 billion in only ten countries"). See also id. at 92, 258 (statements of
revenue generated by exported copyright industries). See generally US. Adherence to the
Berne Convention: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d

Sess. (1985-86) [hereinafter Hearings,99th Cong.] (testimony on effect of U.S.'s nonmembership in Berne).
5. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (1972) (as amended), 102 Stat. 2853, T.I.A.S. No. (1988).
6. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
7. Hearings, 100th Cong., supra note 4, at 97-99 (statement of Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Trade Representative. See also infra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text.
8. S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988) [hereinafter S. REP.].
9. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810).
10. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
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citizen of the United States,1 in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of the United States. 1
Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity testified about the implications of this policy:
For most of our first century of nationhood, we were takers. We stole
what others created. Nobody could match us in our disdain for the rights
of foreign authors such as Dickens, Thackeray, or Gilbert and Sullivan.
But we soon learned that our behavior came at a cost as other nations
denied our own authors the rights we had denied
theirs. When nations
2
behave that way, all of them are net losers.'
B.

Berne Convention and Its Antecedents

American reluctance to provide copyright protection to foreigners
culminated with the decision to refrain from participating in the signing
of Berne. Five important conferences had been convened earlier to
replace haphazard bilateral and multilateral agreements with a uniform
scheme of international copyright protection. First, in 1858, the "Congress of Authors and Artists" met in Brussels and passed resolutions
urging the adoption of uniform law at the national level. 13 Second, the
"International Literary Congress" convened in Paris in 1878 and created an international association to focus on issues of international
copyright. t 4 Third, the International Literary and Artistic Association
convened in Berne in 1883 and prepared a draft convention which it
presented to the Swiss government. 15 Fourth, based on this document,
the Swiss government convened an official diplomatic conference in
Berne in 1884, which adopted a revised draft convention. 16 The United
States did not participate in the 1884 conference.' 7 Fifth, during a second official conference in 1885, twenty nations including the United
States sent delegates, who revised the 1884 draft.' 8 Switzerland communicated the draft convention to fifty-five nations with an invitation to
11. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 5, 1 Stat. 124, 125.
12. Hearings, 100th Cong., supra note 4, at 72-73.

13. See S.

LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC

PROPERTY 71-72 (1938).
14. See id. at 73, 74. The Congress ultimately adopted five resolutions: (1) an

author's right to his work is not a grant of law, but a type of property which legislatures must guarantee; (2) the author's right to his work runs perpetually; (3) nations
may fix a period whereby an author's work enters the public domain, thereby permitting any person to reproduce an author's work; (4) nations should treat domestic and
foreign works equally; and (5) an author should receive protection if he complies
with the ordinary formalities prescribed by a nation. Id. Under the direction of
Victor Hugo, the 1878 Congress created the International Literary and Artistic Association. The Association paved the way for international cooperation and subsequent
draft conventions. Id. See also Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 121-22 (testi-

mony of Donald J. Quigg, Acting Commissioner for Patents and Trademarks).
15. See S. LADAS, supra note 13, at 75-76.

16. See id. at 76-80.
17. See id. at 77.
18. See id. at 80-82.
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sign the Convention at a final diplomatic conference in Berne in 1886.19
The original Convention had five primary objectives: first, the promulgation of copyright laws throughout the countries of the world; second, the elimination of artificial timing barriers to international
copyright enforcement; third, the abolition of intellectual property protectionism or unnecessary preferences for domestic artists over foreign
artists; fourth, the eradication of superfluous and burdensome formalities or procedural barriers to enforcement of legitimate copyrights; and
fifth, the promotion of uniform international copyright protection. 20
Despite twenty-five years of international negotiation and study, the simple and straightforward document was adopted by only ten nations in
1886.21 Since then, however, the Convention has grown into the
22
world's premier multilateral copyright treaty.
Although the United States attended the 1885 Berne Conference, it
chose to attend the 1886 conference only as an observer and did not
sign the Convention. 23 Because United States law did not grant aliens
any jurisdiction to protect their copyrights in domestic courts, 24 the
United States could not meet the terms of Berne.
C.

Post-Berne U.S. International Copyright Efforts

After Berne, the U.S. took an important step towards harmony with the
new international copyright regime by passing the Chace Act in 1891.25
With this legislation, Congress finally provided copyright protection
under American law for foreign authors not resident in the U.S.26
Despite removal of this obstacle to Berne accession, U.S. law remained
incompatible with the Convention in other respects. Most notably, at
the same time Congress extended copyright protection to foreign
authors, it enacted the "manufacturing clause. '' 27 This clause required
that certain steps in the production of books and periodicals be performed in the U.S. or Canada. 28 Violation of this clause by a foreign
manufacturer barred domestic copyright protection of those foreign
19. See id. at 82.
20. H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 12.
21. S.LADAS, supra note 13, at 82-83.
22. See H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 6.
23. See S. LADAS, supra note 13, at 82-83.
24. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
25. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106.
26. This protection to foreign authors was expressly conditioned on reciprocal
extension by the author's state to U.S. citizens. 26 Stat. 1110 ("That this act shall
only apply to a citizen or subject of a foreign state when such foreign state or nation
permits to citizens of the United States of America the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as its own citizens...").
27. 17 U.S.C. § 601 (1982). Under the terms of the Act ofJuly 13, 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-215, 96 Stat. 178 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 601), the manufacturing clause
expired on June 30, 1986.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1982) ("...
literary material that is in the English language and is protected under this title is prohibited unless the portions consisting of
such material have been manufactured in the United States or Canada").
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works. 29 The Convention, on the other hand, prohibits a signatory from
conditioning an author's enjoyment of rights to a literary work on any
such formality.3 0 Accordingly, instead of joining the Berne Union, the
United States sought bilateral and multilateral agreements with other
3
nations to protect intellectual property. '
After World War I, the foreign market for United States goods grew
rapidly.3 2 This growth prompted some representatives of copyright
interests to suggest that ratification of the Berne Convention would
grant American copyright holders workable remedies against foreign
piracy.3 3 Nonetheless, ratification efforts in this era failed because the

task of revising United States copyright law to comply with Berne fell
behind other priorities.
The Rome Revision of the Berne Convention 3 4 in 1928 created a
major new obstacle to U.S. accession. The Rome Conference added the
recognition of the so-called "moral rights" as a new obligation of Berne
signatories. 35 In essence, this gave authors a right to claim authority
over their works and to object to excessive modification of their works
29. 17 U.S.C. § 601(d).
30. Convention, supra note 5, at art. 5. In pertinent part, Article 5 states that:
(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected
under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of
origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant
to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.
(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to
any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the
existence of protection in the country of origin of the work. Consequently,
apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well
as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be
governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.
31. These bilateral agreements included treaties with China in 1903, Japan in
1905, Hungary in 1912, and Siam in 1920; multilateral treaties included the Pan
American Conventions of 1902 and 1910. S. LADAS, supra note 13, at 837-38.
32. According to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in a 1936 memorandum to President Roosevelt,
More than a quarter of a century has elapsed since there was any comprehensive alteration in the law of the United States granting and regulating copyrights. During the period many changes have occurred in the type and scope
of the production and distribution of literary and artistic works. The United
States is probably the world's largest producer of literary and artistic works
....
These works are known throughout the world and are an important
factor in domestic and foreign commerce.
H.R. REP. No. 2514, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1936).
33. See, e.g., Universal Copyright Convention and Implementing Legislation: Hearings on
Executive Al, 1st Sess., the Universal Copyight Convention and S.2559, a Bill to Amend Title
17, U S.C., Entitled "Copyrights" Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations
and a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciar',83d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1954) [hereinafter Hearings, 83d Cong.]; Mathews, Thirty Years of International Copyright, N.Y.
Times, June 26, 1921, § III (Magazine), at 2.
34. Repinted in S. LADAS, supra note 13, at 1156 (full text).
35. Convention, supra note 5, at art. 6 bis. Article 6 bis provides in pertinent part:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of,
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independent of contractual rights. 3 6 American sentiment for ratification
quickly dissipated. Publishers and movie producers voiced apprehensions that moral rights could disrupt existing United States copyright
relationships. 37 Other legal problems also stood in the way of U.S.
accession to Berne. The manufacturing clause, 38 incompatible with
Berne precepts,3 9 remained in force. Similarly, as time progressed,
United States copyright law grew to include such provisions as the jukebox laws 4 0 that conflicted with Berne's compulsory licensing
41
prohibitions.
To compensate for the absence of Berne remedies, the United
States worked to create a new international copyright protection mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (hereinafter "UNESCO"). The Universal
Copyright Convention, (hereinafter "UCC") 4 2 ratified by the United
States in 1954, was the result of this effort. 4 3 The UCC was a compromise system that granted the United States some benefits of uniform
international copyright protection while not disrupting America's
or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudiced to his honor or reputation.
See infra note 80.
36. These are generally referred to as the right of paternity and right of integrity,
respectively.
37. Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 123 (history in the testimony of D.
Quigg, Acting Commissioner for Patents and Trademarks). Although the Senate
gave its advice and consent to the Rome text on Apr. 19, 1935, that advice and consent was reconsidered on Apr. 22, 1935 because concurrent revision legislation
failed. See id.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 601 (1982) (repealed 1986). See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
40. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1982). See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
41. Article 11(1) of the Convention guarantees copyright owners the exclusive
right over authorizing public performance of their works). See infra notes 143-44 and
accompanying text.
42. The Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S.
No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132 (as revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No.
7868, 493 U.N.T.S. 178), annotated in A. BOGSCH, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT UNDER
THE UNIVERSAL CONVENTION 3-150 (1968).
43. "The Universal Copyright Convention is amplifying rather than superseding
The Universal Copyright Convention conof the present rights of our citizens ....
tains certain simple minimum rights, compliance with which will require no alteration
of our own copyright standards." Hearings, 83d Cong., supra note 33, at 37 (statement of Sydney M. Kaye, member of the U.S. delegation to the Intergovernmental
Copyright Conference of 1952); S. ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT LAW: BASIC AND
RELATED MATERIALS 249 (1956) (testimony at 1954 hearings on S.2559, A Bill to
Amend Title 17). Similarly, John Schulman of the Authors League of America testified that "the convention takes into account essential differences between the copyNo
right laws in the United States and the systems prevailing in other countries ....
change will be required in the nature of the works to be protected or the nature of
the exclusive rights to be enjoyed under our statute." Hearings, 83d Cong., supra note
33, at 46 (statement ofJohn Schulman, representing the Authors League of America
and the Songwriters Protective Organization), reprinted in S. ROTHENBERG, stpra, at
261.
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unique copyright scheme. 44 As acting Commissioner Donald Quigg of
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office noted in his testimony before the
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights in
1985, "The new Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) was intended
to be a bridge leading to ultimate adherence to Berne. The UCC established minimum standards that could be a new common denominator
both members of the Berne Union and members of the
among States,
'4 5
new UCC.

II. Recent Changes Calling for Ratification of Berne
In recent years, the obstacles to joining the Berne Union began to disappear and the incentives for international protection of copyrights began
to grow. Five recent changes have pressed the U.S. to reconsider membership in Berne: (1) United States withdrawal from UNESCO, (2)
increased international pressure and criticism, (3) growing international
piracy of United States copyrighted material, (4) developments in American law removing incompatibilities with Berne, and (5) an emerging
consensus that existing domestic law satisfies Berne's moral rights
component.
A.

United States Withdrawal from UNESCO

In December 1983, Secretary of State George Schultz announced the
United States's withdrawal from UNESCO, 4 6 the organization that governs the UCC. Although the Department of State concluded that withdrawing from UNESCO would not affect American rights or obligations
under the UCC or other UNESCO-sponsored conventions already
signed by the United States, 4 7 the event had the unintended consequence of reducing the UCC's utility in protecting U.S. copyright interests overseas. As Dr. Arpad Bogsch, Director General of the World
Intellectual Property Organization, observed:
Of course, the United States remains a member of the UCC, but the program activities of UNESCO, which are funded by the UNESCO budget
and are the consequence of a program which is voted by the General
United States would
Assembly of UNESCO, are activities in which the
48
have no influence any more, no direct influence.
Donald Curran, Acting Register of Copyrights in 1985, also noted that
"the utility of UNESCO as a vehicle for promoting the rights secured by
the UCC has been largely abandoned by United States withdrawal from
44. See Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 123-24 (history in the testimony of
Donald J. Quigg, Acting Commissioner for Patents and Trademarks).

45. Id.
46. See Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 32 (testimony of Elinor Constable,
Acting Asst. Secretary of State for the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs,
United States Dept. of State).

47. Id.
48. Id. at 14.
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America's diminished ability to influence international copyright
law became "a matter of political common sense." 50 In the words of Mr.
Curran, "without a presence in the UNESCO Executive Board and General Conference, [the United States] cannot urge the adoption of copyright programs specifically of importance to [its] copyright interests;
[U.S.] failure to contribute to the budget makes it rather awkward to
propose new initiatives to deal with current problems of international
copyright."' 5 1 Thus, as a result of its withdrawal from UNESCO, the
U.S. stood awkwardly on the sidelines with no role in the governing
bodies of the two international copyright conventions. The United
States, ironically the world's largest producer of copyrighted material,
had no role whatsoever in the Berne Convention and a reduced role in
the UCC.
B.

International Pressure and Criticism

The withdrawal from UNESCO spurred the United States's diplomatic
corps to seek aggressively bilateral and multilateral protections for intellectual property. Repeatedly, however, these efforts were rebuffed by
nations who reminded U.S. negotiators of America's failure to join
Berne. 52 Even though copyright protections under American law were
in many ways more comprehensive than Berne, the conspicuous absence
of the United States amongst the Convention's signatory states provided
some foreign states with an excuse to avoid stronger bilateral protections. For instance, the Thai government charged the United States
with hypocrisy for refusing to cooperate under Berne's international
copyright protections during bilateral negotiations aimed at combating
massive and rampant piracy of U.S. works in Thailand. 53 As Congressman Kastenmeier noted, one of the benefits "frequently pointed to in
49. Id. at 113 (response by Donald Curran to question by Senator Mathias on
whether United States loses any rights under the UCC by withdrawing from
UNESCO).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Hearings, 100th Cong., supra note 4, at 93 (statement of Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Trade Representative).
53. S.REP., supra note 8, at 4-5 (1988); see also 134 CONG. REC. S.14553 (daily ed.
Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Senator DeConcini); Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at
708 ("[foreign governments] would have some grounds for questioning the sincerity
of U.S. interests in 'adequate and effective' protection for copyrighted works, when
we ourselves have not chosen to adhere to the Berne Convention. The issues we
would like to focus on in the discussions could be confused if the foreign governments raise the reasons the U.S. had declined to adhere to the Berne Convention")
(article in May 31, 1985 issue of PUBLISHERS WEEKLY quoting Michael Hathaway,

Deputy General Counsel for the U.S. Trade Representative); Hearings, 100th Cong.,
supra note 4, at 93 ("In consultations with the Republic of Korea on copyright matters, the Korean delegation's first question concerned our efforts to join Berne. Too
often we have found that our non-adherence to Berne is the basis for foreign resistance to making changes in their own inadequate laws") (statement of Ambassador
Clayton Yeutter).
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support of United States adherence to the Berne Convention appears to
be enhanced political credibility in our global effort to strengthen copyright norms .... ,54

In addition, failure to join Berne may have a direct impact on the
strength of the U.S. bargaining position during the Uruguay round of
the GATT. 55 There, the U.S. has pressed for the adoption of a code of
conduct concerning the protection of intellectual property worldwide, a
matter in which American prestige and credibility in protection of intellectual property is at issue.56 In sum, ratification of Berne would
strengthen America's bargaining position for accomplishing its international copyright protection policy objectives because "our trade negotiators around the world could insist on these [Berne] standards as those
that constitute adequate protection for GATT as well as [for] bilateral
57
purposes."
C.

Growing Piracy of U.S. Copyrighted Material Abroad

As a major exporter of books, sound recordings, motion pictures and
computer software, the United States has lost billions of dollars to foreign piracy. In 1986 alone, United States companies engaged in the sale
of copyrighted material lost between $43 billion and $63 billion because
of mushrooming piracy abroad. 58 Specific examples demonstrate the
extent to which rampant piracy occurs in all parts of the world. United
States copyright industries lost $1.3 billion in only ten representative
third world developing nations. 5 9 In the Middle East, pirated tapes
were worth over $66 million just in 1982 alone. 60 In fact, pirated cassettes constitute 41-60 percent of the Egyptian market and 90-100 per61
cent of the Saudi Arabian market.
In the Pacific Basin, over 140 million units of copied recordings are
pirated every year. 6 2 In Singapore, for example, police seized 396,837
cassettes during a period of less than one year between 1982 and
54. 133 CONG. REc. H1294 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1987).
55. Id. See also 134 CONG. REc. S14553 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of
Senator DeConcini).
56. S. REP., supra note 8, at 4-5. See also Hearings,99th Cong., supra note 4,at 98.
57. 133 CONG. REC. H1294 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1987) (statement of Representative
Kastenmeier). See also Hearings, 100th Cong., supra note 4, at 93 (statement of Ambassador Clayton Yeutter) ("Achieving meaningful results in negotiations requires leverage. In this area, the leverage comes from setting the right example for the rest of
the world, and that requires adherence to the Berne Convention"); Hearings, 99th
Cong., supra note 4, at 677 (statement of the Recording Industry Association of
America) ("By joining the Berne, the United States would enhance its credibility and
thereby strengthen its bargaining position in bilateral and multilateral copyright
negotiations").
58. S.REP., supra note 8, at 2.
59. See supra note 4.
60. Hearingon Oversight of InterntionalCopyrights Before the Subcomn,. on Patents, Copyright, and Trademarks of the Senate Comin. of thefJndiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984)
(statement by Senator Leahy) [hereinafter Hearings, 98th Cong.].
61. Id. at 91.
62. Id. at 1.
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1983.63 In just nine developing countries, the United States is losing
$128 million in software sales every year. 64 This piracy problem even
extends into Europe, where, for example, officials in West Germany
seized over 20,000 pirated videocassettes in only three months during
1983.65 Major piracy operations also exist in Spain, Great Britain, the
66
Netherlands, and France.
With the exportation of high technology copyright material, such as
computer software and semiconductor chips, the costs inflicted upon
United States businesses engaged in the production of copyrighted
material directly harms American workers. The loss of American technology means that jobs performed in America can now be performed
abroad by America's competitors. 67 Inadequate copyright protection
unfairly undermined America's competitive advantage in high technol68
ogy fields and impinged on national security.
D.

Development of More Compatible American Law

For many years, the presence of a series of compulsory licenses and formalities in U.S. law conflicted with Berne requirements, rendering
accession difficult. In recent years, however, United States law has
grown more compatible with the Convention. The manufacturing
clause 69 constituted a major compulsory license in U.S. law. By conditioning copyright protection on use of domestic manufacturing
processes, United States law directly conflicted with the unconditional
guarantees of Berne against formalities that impede an author's enjoyment of rights to a literary work. 70 The 99th Congress, however,
decided after some debate to allow the provision to expire. 7 ' Thus,
Congress enlarged the sphere of compatibility between United States
copyright law and the Berne Convention.
Accession to the Convention also became more possible because
other provisions of United States copyright law were susceptible to
restructuring to comply with the Convention. For instance, because
63. Id. at 101.
64. Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 245 (statement of Vico E. Henriques,
President, Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association).
65. Hearings, 98th Cong., supra note 60, at 1.
66. Id. at 115.
67. See Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 292-93 (statement of the United
States Council for International Business). According to the Council's report,

"Copyright piracy undermines the international position of numerous companies in
vital United States industries." Id. For instance, copyright infringement is the most
critical trade barrier to the communications industry. Id. at 293.
68. Id. ("The impact on some [companies], such as those producing computer
software, semi-conductor chips and telecommunications, implicates potential issues
of national security . . . [and] [d]rains away the comparative advantage from high

technology products developed by the United States and other nations").
69. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
70. See Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 453-54 (Final Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention). In particular, see id.
at 454 n.2 (describing what constitutes a formality).
71. Id.
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Berne expressly protects works of architecture, 7 2 Title 17 easily was
changed to add "architectural plans," making it explicit that U.S. law
already protected such plans. 7 3 It was similarly easy to avoid conflicts
between Berne and works that have already entered into the public
domain under U.S. law by providing that the amendments to the copy74
The jukebox
right law compelled by Berne do not apply retroactively.
76
75
more diffiposed
laws and mandatory copyright notice provisions
Berne's
to
to
conform
cult, but far from insuperable, challenges
.77
requirements
E.

Growing Consensus that Existing Domestic Law Satisfies Berne's
Moral Rights Component

As will be discussed later, the primary obstacle to ratification of Berne in
recent years has been the difficulty of reconciling U.S. copyright law with
the much broader French concept of moral rights. 7 8 The 1928 Rome
Revision to the Berne Convention expressly recognized certain moral
80
rights of authors. 79 These so-called moral rights include the legal
right to claim authorship and to object to modifications of a copyrighted
work.8 1 If interpreted in light of the French moral rights model, these
1928 revisions could disrupt U.S. copyright doctrines and relationships. 8 2 For years, this potential conflict created a seemingly insurmountable barrier to Berne ratification.
In a floor statement given shortly before adoption of S.1301,83 the
Senate version of the Berne copyright bill, Senator DeConcini aptly
summarized the consideration given to the issue of whether American
law sufficiently protects moral rights under Berne standards:
There has been debate as to whether these "moral rights" already exist
under U.S. laws, or whether new laws must be created ensuring these
rights to artists before the U.S. law can become compatible with Berne
After careful consideration, the committee report concluded that
....
protection adequate to conform to Berne is provided for under existing
72. Convention, supra note 5, at art. 2: ("(1) The expression 'literary and artistic
works' shall include ... works of architecture").
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See S.

REP.,

supra note 8, at 8-9.

74. S. REP.. supra note 8, at 48.

75. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1982). See infra note 142 and accom-

panying text.
76. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-11,

205, 304 (1982). See i'fra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 145-49, 162-79 and accompanying text.
78. See ifra notes 142-79 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
80. Article 6 bis of the Berne Convention does not employ the term "moral
rights." See supra note 35. The term "moral rights" often encompasses more than
the rights of paternity and integrity covered by the Convention. 2 M. NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21 (1987). The Berne Convention distinguishes these rights
from the economic rights generally associated with copyright protection.
81. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
83. S.1301, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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laws ....
[e]xisting laws have been applied by courts to redress authors
84
for injuries suffered as a result of the violation of their moral rights.
The Committee's agreement on this issue followed upon a broader
consensus reached throughout much of the copyright community.
International legal scholars, as well as the State and Commerce Departments, developed a consensus through years of consideration that
existing United States law is sufficient to satisfy the moral rights requirements of Berne. 8 5 This consensus was communicated to Congress in a
particularly persuasive manner during a visit by five members of the
House of Representatives to Geneva and Paris in late 1987. During consultations with international copyright experts, the Congressmen
became aware of the breadth of the consensus that the "U.S. should and
' 86
can adhere to Berne without making major changes in U.S. law."
The international consultants emphasized that existing U.S. law
protects the essential elements of moral rights. For instance, Section
106(2) of the United States Copyright Act 87 recognizes the right to control modification of a work by giving authors an exclusive right to produce derivative works based on their own previous works. 8 8 Also,
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 89 protects an author's rights by prohibiting false designation of the origin of literary or artistic works. 90 Moreover, America's enforcement of common law rights protects various
components of the moral rights concept through theories of contract,9 1
defamation,9 2 and unfair competition.9 3 Finally, eight states have
84. 134 CONG. REC. S14553 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988).
85. See Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 94-95 (statement of Donald Curran,
Acting Register of Copyrights); id. at 324 (statement of U.S. Council for International
Business).
86. H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 9.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 106 ("... the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights ...

(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.

).

88. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
90. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)
(where the right of an author to prevent distortion or truncation of work protected by
copyright was at issue, the court described § 43(a) as "the right of the artist to have
his work attributed to him in the form in which he created it"). See also 2 M. NIMMER,

supra note 80, at §§ 8.21[C]-[F] (1987).
91. See Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 193-94, 122 N.Y.S. 206,
207-08 (1910) (Seabury,J., concurring), where thejudge noted, "Contracts are to be
so construed as to give effect to the intention of the parties .... If the intent of the
parties was that the defendant should purchase the rights to the literary property and
publish it, the author is entitled not only to be paid for his work but to have it published in the manner in which he wrote it. The purchaser cannot garble it, or put it
out under another name than the author's ....
See also Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d
585 (2d Cir. 1952) (false attribution constituted breach of contract). But see Nimmer,
Iplicationsof the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the 'nited States Copyright
Law, 19 ST\N. L. REV. 499, 520-23 (1966-67).

92. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 80, at § 8.21 [D] ("Another theory sometimes
invoked is that of defamation, where the work falsely attributed to the author is of an
inferior quality and consequently damages his reputation") and note 51 therein.
93. Jaeger v. American International Pictures, 330 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (action for garbling and distortion of plaintiff's film) ("Whether or not there is
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to a limited degree, moral rights of
enacted specific statutes protecting,
94
art.
of
works
certain
in
authors
In sum, the international copyright community recognized that the
American model of copyright protection, although different in some
respects from the French model, satisfies the basic requirements of Article 6 bis of the Berne Convention. 95 This recognition opened the door
to U.S. accession to Berne without disruption of existing copyright relationships and may well have been the most significant single step toward
the Implementation Act and accession to Berne.

m.

The 100th Congress's Path to Accession

A. The Political Framework
Although pressure for accession to Berne was building and the climate
for ratification was improving, the legislative task of bringing U.S. law
into conformity with the treaty remained daunting. Twice before, in
1909 and in 1976, Congress had undertaken major revisions of copyright law and refused to acknowledge the benefits of conformity with
Berne. 9 6 In 1935, the Senate had actually voted to ratify Berne, only to
reverse itself three days later. 97 Despite the growing consensus on sufficiency of U.S. law to satisfy the moral rights provisions of Berne, important domestic interests continuted to harbor concerns that ratification
98
Morecould endanger their existing U.S. copyright arrangements.
over, with larger items on its agenda, Congress is easily distracted from
efforts to improve intellectual property law. Mobilized by interests who
feared the implications of Berne's moral rights edicts, a few Senators or
even a single Senator could indefinitely delay a copyright bill.
The legislative difficulties of preparing for ratification of Berne were
compounded by the number of congressional bodies participating in an
any square counterpart in American law of the 'moral right' of artists assertedly rec-

ognized on the European continent, there is enough in plaintiff's allegations to suggest that he may yet be able to prove a charge of unfair competition or otherwise

tortious misbehavior in the distribution to the public of a film.., that bears his name
but at the same time severely garbles, distorts or mutilates his work").
94. Cal. Civ. Code § 987 (West Supp. 1988); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 51:2151-2156
(West 1987); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, § 303 (Supp. 1987-88); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1988); NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:24A-1 to 2A:24A-8
(West 1987); N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aft.Law §§ 14.51-.59 (McKinney 1984); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 73, §§ 2101-10 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 5-62-2 to 5-62-6 (1987).
95. See Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 458 (statement of Ad Hoc Working
Group on U.S. Adherence to Berne):
Given the substantial protection now available for the real equivalent of
moral rights under statutory and common law in the U.S., the lack of conformity in protection in other Berne nations, the absence of moral rights provisions in some of their copyright laws, and the reservation of control over
remedies to each Berne country, the protection of moral rights in the United
States is comparable with the Berne Convention.
96. Hearings, 100th Cong., supra note 4, at 140-143 (statement of Ralph Oman.
Register of Copyrights).

97. Id.
98. See, e.g., H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 34-39.
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accession effort. Process required that both the House and SenateJudiciary Committees (working with the relevant subcommittees of each)
approve any copyright bill making the remaining changes necessary to
meet Berne's standards, and that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approve the ratification resolution. Thus, any opponents to the
accession effort would have ample opportunities to find a sympathetic
congressional ear, magnifying the significance of potential disagreements over issues like moral rights. In short, the 100th Congress faced
significant obstacles to Berne ratification.
B.

Moral Rights Under Article 6 bis of Berne

1.

Scope of the Problem

At the outset of the 100th Congress, the "moral rights" obstacle
remained in the path of legislation to implement the Convention. Like
many legal and legislative issues, the battleground of the moral rights
issue consisted of words and their definitions. The term "moral rights"
had its origins in two French law concepts: the right of paternity (the
right to be acknowledged as the author of a particular work) and the
right of integrity (the right of authors to object to modifications which
prejudice their honor or reputation). 9 9
Incorporating the French model of moral rights into U.S. law had
the potential to alter drastically current domestic copyright relationships. Expansively interpreted, the right of paternity, for instance, could
change or abrogate the work-for-hire doctrine whereby an author
receives compensation to produce a work whose copyright is held by the
author's employer rather than the author. 10 0 The right of integrity
could complicate the ability of magazine and movie producers to edit a
publication or film. 10 ' Instead of editors unilaterally determining what
editing changes in a work are necessary to comply with time or space
limitations, the author might have the final prerogative to object to editing on the basis of artistic integrity. Needless to say, these prospects
troubled many politically powerful entertainment and publishing interests with existing copyright and contractual agreements with authors
02
and artists. 1
99. For overviews of the history and scope of differing conceptions of moral
rights, see Horwitz, Artists' Rights in the United States: Towards Federal Legislation, 25
HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 153, 155-58 (1988); Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in
the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 561-72 (1940). The
French concept includes a right to create and publish, or not, and to do so in the
form of the author's choice. Roeder, supra at 558. In addition, the French concept
contemplates a right to modify an artist's own work, that is, a right to make "additions, suppressions and other modifications which the author may deem necessary in
order to make the work conform to the state of his intellectual convictions." Id. at

565.
100. See Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 102-03.
101. Id. at 93.
102. See, e.g., H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 34-38 (summary testimony).
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Moral Rights in US. Courts

The prospect of changes in U.S. law on the basis of moral rights was a
familiar theme in the federal courts. Litigants have often petitioned federal courts to expand U.S. law to match the sweep of the French notion
of moral rights. Nevertheless, federal courts have refused to incorporate such an expansive model of moral rights into U.S. copyright law. As
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed in the fountainhead case
of Vargas v. Esquire,10 3 "the conception of 'moral rights' . . . has not yet
received acceptance in the law of the United States ...[w]hat plaintiff in
reality seeks is a change in the law of this country to conform to that of
certain other countries ... we are not disposed to make any new law in
0 4
this respect." 1
Federal courts resisted incorporation of broad moral rights concepts into the federal common law for several reasons. First, judicial
acknowledgment of unfettered moral rights would create apparent conflicts with basic principles of U.S. copyright law. An unconditional right
of integrity or paternity, for example, might conflict with the statutory
entitlement, under appropriate circumstances, to uncompensated use of
works in the public domain. 10 5 Second, federal courts have refrained
from adopting moral rights arguments in the absence of any clear standards defining the bounds of the asserted entitlements. One state court,
for instance, faced with a moral rights claim brought by a composer,
articulated the difficulty of ascertaining, in the absence of a defining federal law, what standards should govern purported moral rights violations: "Is the standard to be good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs,
moral concepts, or what is it to be?"' 1 6 At the very least, a great deal of
litigation would be necessary to ascertain the limits of Berne's moral
rights if Congress adopted Berne as U.S. law by an unlimited act of ratification. The specters of fundamental change in United States copyright
law and a potential flood of litigation have thus far convinced courts to
refuse to adopt in toto the French concept of moral rights.
Federal courts, however, have shown some sensitivity to claims
predicated upon moral rights-based allegations by applying state and
federal laws that adequately protect the basic components of moral
rights, namely the right of artists to receive adequate compensation for
and retain control over their creative activity. Because of the adequacy
of existing protections for creative rights, federal courts have managed
to refrain from expanding American common law to include the broader
103. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
104. Id. at 526 (quoting S. LADAS, supra note 13, at 802). See also Crimi v.Rutgers
Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (action to compel defendant to remove obliterating paints on mural painted on defendant's wall by

plaintiff).
105. T'argas, 164 F.2d at 526.
106. Shostakovich v. 20th Century Fox Film, 196 Misc. 67, 71, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575,
579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948), afftd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dept. 1949)
(accredited author of music used in film has no copyright protection even if author is
offended by depictions in film).
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French notions of moral rights. In Geizel v. Poynter Productions,10 7 for
instance, an artist urged the court, in the absence of specific contractual
provisions preserving artistic integrity, to imply contractual prohibitions
on a magazine publisher's ability to alter the artist's drawings. In
rejecting the artist's argument, the court observed that "the doctrine of
moral right [sic] is not part of the law of the United States [citations
omitted], except insofar as parts of that doctrine exist in our law as specific rights-such as copyright, libel, privacy and unfair competition." 108
Similarly, the concurrence in Granz v. Harris109 rejected a moral rights
claim but awarded a judgment nonetheless on the grounds that existing
common law already entitled the plaintiff to prevent publication of a
"garbled version" of his product. " 0 Thus, existing American law was
found sufficient to protect basic rights of artists.
3.

Congressional Treatment of the Moral Rights Issue

The above opinions foresaw the compromise that enabled Congress to
circumvent the potentially fatal fight over defining the bounds of moral
rights. Congress avoided this pitfall by recognizing the emerging consensus among legal scholars that current federal and state laws provide
protections for an author's rights sufficient to constitute compliance
with Berne." I U.S. laws clearly supply great protection to the basic
rights of artists to receive compensation for their creativity and to preserve, by contract or otherwise, the integrity of their works. In essence,
these basic rights are the foundation of Berne's moral rights component.
Therefore, existing U.S. protections satisfy the basic demands of the
Berne Convention's moral rights provisions. This consensus was incorporated directly into S.1301, the Senate version of the Berne Convention copyright bill, through language promising that the implementing
amendments would neither expand nor reduce existing copyright
protections. 112
At the outset of the legislative process, the Reagan Administration
adopted a careful strategy to ensure that adherence to the Convention
would not adversely affect the development of American copyright law.
107. 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
108. Id. at 340 n.5.
109. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (moral rights claim raised where defendant made
recordings of plaintiff's singing and sold records without accreditation).
110. Id. at 590-91. See also Edison v. Viva Int'l, Ltd., 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d
203 (1st Dept. 1979), in which the court recognized that American judicial decisions
have protected the integrity of authors and artists, but never on strictly "moral
rights" grounds. Id. at 384, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 206. The express grounds on which
common law protection has been given include libel, unfair competition, copyright,
right to privacy, and tort. Schoff v. Simon & Schuster, 6 Misc.2d 383, 387, 162
N.Y.S.2d 770, 774 (Sup. Ct. 1957), af'd 12 A.D.2d 475, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dept.
1957).
111. S. REP., supra note 8., at 9-10; H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 32-40. See supra
notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
I 12. S. REP.. supra note 8, at 10.
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The Administration's bill, S. 1971,113 employed the same "neither
expand nor reduce" language to eliminate the chance that moral rights
might creep into the U.S. Code through Berne adherence."l 4 In addition, S.1971 states that Berne does not create an independent right to
paternity or integrity, that Congress need not pass additional legislation
to comply with Berne moral rights obligations, and that Berne is not
itself a source ofjudicial relief. 1 5 Thus, the Administration agreed that
current U.S. copyright protections satisfied the moral rights component
of Berne.
Despite these studied efforts to insulate the Berne implementation
legislation from efforts to write new moral rights into U.S. law, pressure
in favor of an expansion of U.S. law began to build prior to the hearings
in the Senate on S.1301 and S.1971.11 6 Indeed the hearing itself featured prominent motion picture celebrities requesting such an expansion.1 1 7 The noted movie director and producer, Steven Spielberg,
stated:
The Berne Treaty, Mr. Chairman, gives voice to this idea that art and the
artist are not commodities to be treated like sausage. The Berne treaty
gives to the artist a specific standing to object to a defacement of his or
her work, and it recognizes moral rights as distinct from economic
rights.... Our adversaries maintain that United States law is sufficient to
qualify for Berne membership.... No film fantasy is as outlandish or as
blatant as that claim. 118
This pressure to adopt expansive moral rights was countered by a
draft amendment which proposed to build a high insulating wall
between any moral rights concepts and U.S. copyright law." I- Introduced during the hearings, this discussion amendment proposed enactment of a federal preemption on any state that might attempt by court
decision to adopt the broad French model of moral rights. Although
not actively pursued in subsequent negotiations on the implementation
bills, this discussion draft served its purpose by neutralizing the pleas
for enhanced moral rights, preserving the delicate compromise built
into S.1301 and S.1971. S.1301 continued on the course of guaranteeing that Berne accession would not disrupt existing copyright
relationships.
With the hearings complete, the Senate Judiciary Committee proceeded toward a compromise built on the premise that any implement113. Hearings, 100th Cong., supra note 4, at 27.
114. 133 CONG. REc. S.18408 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1987) (statement by Senator

Hatch).
115. Id.
116. The Washington Post, Feb. 28, 1988, at GI (editorial by Director George
Lucas).
117. See Hearings, 100th Cong., supra note 4, at 479-546 (statements of George
Lucas and Steven Spielberg).
118. Id. at 502 (statement of Steven Spielberg).
119. 134 CONG. REC. S1670-1671 (daily ed. March 2, 1988) (statement by Senator
Hatch).
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ing legislation should leave undisturbed the delicate balance of rights
U.S. law granted to domestic authors and copyright owners.1' The
Senate therefore effectively rejected any broad notions of incorporating
moral rights language into American law and at the same time underscored its belief in the adequacy of current American law in providing
protections sufficient to comply with Berne's protections. By means of a
very terse comment in the Senate Report accompanying S. 1301 stating
that "the 'moral rights' doctrine is not incorporated into the U.S. law by
this statute,"' 12 1 the Senate paved the way for accession.
In the wake of the hearings, the leading members of the Senate Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks Subcommittee entered negotiations
on language to maintain the status quo on moral rights. 12 2 Those discussions refined the basic compromise embodied in the implementing
legislation. These adjustments included additional language to ensure
that the Berne Convention would be given effect only under the Copyright Act (Title 17 of the U.S. Code) and relevant provisions of existing
federal, state, and common law. 123 As the Senate Report explains,
S.1301 "makes explicit what is implicit in the foregoing: that the Berne
Convention is not directly enforceable in U.S. Courts."' 12 4 With these
slight alterations, in addition to the strongly expressed instruction that
Berne is not self-executing, 1 25 S.1301 clearly avoided incorporation of
the foreign concept of moral rights into American copyright law.
The House Judiciary Committee encountered similar pressures to
employ the Berne Convention implementation bill to expand U.S. copyright law. At the outset of the legislative process in the House, Chairman Kastenmeier of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice, which had jurisdiction over the
implementation legislation, introduced a bill designed to "raise all the
questions that must be asked for the fullest ranges of public and private
interests to be aware of what Berne adherence will mean now and
tomorrow."' 12 6 This bill, H.R. 1623,127 included many of the expansions which might bring U.S. law closer to the broad French concept of
28
moral rights. 1
120. 134 CONG. REc. S.14553 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement by Senator
DeConcini).
121. S.REP., supra note 8, at 10.
122. These negotiations featured primarily Senator DeConcini, the Chairman of
the Subcommittee; Senator Hatch, the Ranking Republican on the Subcommittee;
and Senator Leahy, the principal author of S.1301. Several other Senators on the
Subcommittee played leading roles in these negotiations and all legislative efforts on
the Senate side, including Senator Simpson, Senator Grassley, Senator Kennedy,
Senator Heflin, and the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee (Senator Biden) and
the Ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee (Senator Thurmond).
123. S.REP., supra note 8, at 39.
124. Id.

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 38.
133 CONG. REC. 1293-94 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1987).
H.R. 1623, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
Id. at §§ 7,13.
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At the initial House Subcommittee hearings, the Magazine Publishers Association and the Coalition to Preserve the American Copyright
Tradition, among others, voiced strong opposition to H.R. 1623.129
Several witnesses at the hearings suggested that current U.S. law, "especially the common law, [is] fully sufficient to meet our obligations under
Berne without the need for federal statutory provisions on the so-called
'moral right.' "130
At this juncture, the Chairman and several other members of the
Subcommittee travelled to Geneva and Paris to consult with international copyright experts. In particular, these Congressmen were
13 1
impressed by the statements of Dr. Bogsch:
... it is not necessary for the United States of America to enact statutory
provisions on moral rights in order to comply with Article 6 bis of the
Berne Convention. The requirements under this Article can be fulfilled
not only by statutory provisions13in
a copyright statute but also by the
2
common law and other statutes.

As a result of these foreign consultations, Chairman Kastenmeier
modified his bill and adopted a strong "minimalist" approach to compliance with the demands of the Berne Convention in H.R. 4262,133 a subsequent version of the implementing legislation. By "minimalist,"
Chairman Kastenmeier meant "making only those changes to American
34
copyright law that are clearly required under the treaty's provisions."1
This decision to pursue the least intrusive course was based on the view
that existing American law protected the basic values of moral rights.
Under Chairman Kastenmeier's leadership, the House resisted further strenuous efforts to incorporate moral rights into H.R. 4262.
Accordingly, the moral rights provisions of the House and Senate bills
were strikingly similar and House and Senate representatives quickly
reconciled the two bills on the moral rights issue. Both the House and
Senate agreed to adopt the notion that the implementing bill would
neither expand nor reduce the scope of existing U.S. copyright law.
The 100th Congress, however, did not foreclose future Congresses
or state legislatures from expanding U.S. intellectual property rights.
Already the issue of colorization of black and white movies has
prompted several witnesses at congressional hearings to recommend
that the U.S. should adopt a right of integrity governing alterations of
129. Berne Convention hiplementation Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1623 Before the
Subcomn. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJusticeof the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 331-408 (1988) (statements of
Coalition to Preserve the American Copyright Tradition and the Magazine Publishers
Association).
130. Id. at 692 (statement of Barbara Ringer).
131. See also text accompanying note 48.
132. H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 37.
133. H.R. 4262, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
134. H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 37.

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 22

movies.' 3 5 Any future debates about the virtues of expanded protections for artists, however, will focus on the merits of such protections.
Congress ensured that broad conceptions of moral rights will not indirectly creep into American law by virtue of U.S. adherence to Berne.
C.

Self-Execution and Effective Date

The question of self-execution, i.e., whether the terms of a treaty
become legally binding upon ratification or upon enactment of subsequent implementing legislation, is an issue that arises with nearly every
treaty that passes through the Senate.' 3 6 Self-execution is particularly
relevant in the context of such provisions in the Convention as prohibitions against formalities and compulsory licensing 137 because Berne's
traditional French notion of artistic rights differs from the demands of
the U.S. Code.' 38 If these Convention provisions were self-executing,
federal courts would be obligated to acknowledge changes in U.S. law
that Congress did not enact.
In light of these implications, Congress ensured that Berne would
not be self-executing by including two provisions in the implementing
legislation. First, both S.1301 and H.R. 4262 expressly state that Berne
is not self-executing.' 39 Second, by setting the effective date of the
implementing legislation to coincide with the date of accession to the
Convention, Congress ensured that the treaty would not take precedence over the implementing legislation by virtue of timing. 140 Otherwise, if the Convention were allowed to become effective ahead of the
implementing legislation, courts would arguably be required to honor
claims alleging that the treaty changed U.S. law in any suit filed before
the implementing legislation took effect.
The language in the Implementation Act thus ensures that U.S.
copyright laws would continue to govern all rights under the Berne Convention. In the direct words of the House Judiciary Committee report,
"Berne's provisions themselves, and the simple fact of adherence to the
Convention, will not in any way affect current law or its future

development." 141

135. See Hemings, 100th Cong., supra note 4, at 479-544 (statements of Lucas,
Goldman, Spielberg and Directors Guild of America). See generally Hearings on
Colorization before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
136. See Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 503 (discussing the distinction
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties and quoting TIhitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
137. Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 5 and I I.
138. See the jukebox compulsory licensing provision, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1982) (conflicting with art. I 1(1) of Berne); requirements to mark copyrighted material, 17
U.S.C. §§ 408-11 (1982) (conflicting with art. 5(2) of Berne); and compliance with
copyright registration requirements as a prerequisite to judicial relief, 17 U.S.C.
§ 411 (a) (1982) (conflicting with art. 5(2) of Berne).
139. S. REP., supra note 8, at 38; H.R. REP. supra note 6, at 2.
140. S. REP., supra note 8, at 28.
141. H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 39.
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D. Jukeboxes and Other Compulsory Licenses
One aspect of United States law which needed revision to comply with
Berne's requirements governed relations between jukebox operators
and music copyright holders. Title 17 of the U.S. Code mandates the
compulsory licensing of the performance of musical works on coin-operated jukeboxes.14 2 Article 11(1) of the Berne Convention prohibits
some forms of compulsory licensing, including the jukebox license provisions of current law, in its provision that "[a]uthors of ... musical
works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorising... the public performance of their works." This exclusive right applies to public performances "by any means or process." 14 3 Thus, Berne's public
performance provisions cover performance by means of recordings. On
its face, Article 11(1) conflicts with the jukebox compulsory licensing
scheme of Title 17.144
To remedy this conflict, the Implementation Act replaces the compulsory license in current law with provisions that adequately protect the
domestic jukebox industry, but also comply with Berne. The Implementation Act allows copyright owners and jukebox operators to negotiate
voluntary licensing agreements.' 4 5 As long as the parties can voluntarily agree on performance rights injukeboxes, their new licensing agreements will suprecede ratemaking by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. 146
If the parties cannot agree, the Implementation Act permits the Tribunal to reinstitute a compulsory arrangement. 14 7 Pending completion of
the voluntary negotiations, the terms of the compulsory license remain
in place. 148
Mr. Ralph Oman, the Register of Copyrights, testified that by preferring voluntary agreements to a compulsory license, H.R. 4262 would
satisfy the demands of Berne. He noted that "[s]ome Berne Union
countries do regulate organizations representing authors and copyright
proprietors, including the setting of fees."' 14 9 Accordingly, the jukebox
compromise embodied in the Implementation Act is analogous to
existing arrangements in Berne Union countries.
While concluding that that jukebox licensing provisions required
alteration under the public performances provision of Article 11(1),
Congress rightly maintained other compulsory licensing schemes in
Title 17. The cable compulsory license, 150 for example, is permissible
142. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1982).
143. Convention, supra note 5, at art. 2(1)(i) (emphasis added).
144. See Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 447 (report of the Ad Hoc Working

Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention).
145. S. REP., supra note 8, at 33, 41-42.
146. Id. at 27.
147. Id. at 32-33, 42-43.
148. Id. at 33, 42.
149. Hearings, 100th Cong., supra note 4, at 154.

150. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
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under Article ilbis (2) of Berne, 15 1 which permits those compulsory
licenses guaranteeing "authors of literary and artistic works" an "equitable remuneration . . . fixed by a competent authority" and having no
52
extraterritorial application and no prejudicial effect on moral rights.'
Similarly, the mechanical license provided by § 115 of the Copyright
Act 153 survives Article 13(1) of Berne,' 54 which allows some compulsory
155
licenses to record specified musical works.
E.

Formalities

The Convention prohibits signatories from creating "formalities" which
might pose obstacles for the "enjoyment or exercise" of rights of
authors seeking copyright protection. 156 Formalities typically condition
copyright protection on technical administrative rules. 15 7 Prior to the
Implementation Act, U.S. copyright law contained several such procedural provisions, including requirements to mark copyrighted material
with a small "c" in a circle, 158 requirements to register copyrighted
material as a prerequisite to any enforcing lawsuit,' 59 requirements to
record a publication with the Library of Congress's Copyright Office
before filing an infringement suit,' 60 and renewal of registration in
16 1
order to enjoy a second term of copyright protection.
The mandatory notice of copyright, the circle "c" marking, falls so
clearly within Berne's prohibition on formalities that both Senate and
House bills recommended deletion of the requirement. Mandatory
notice had been a feature of American copyright law for two centuries. 1 62 To preserve many of the benefits of notice, H.R. 4262 encourages voluntary affixation of notice markings by instructing courts to
disregard any claim of innocent infringement in mitigation of statutory
or actual damages in an infringement action. 163 Innocent infringement
151. For an explanation of this view, see Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 43334 (report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention).
152. Convention, supra note 5, at art. 11 bis(2).

153. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
154. Convention, supra note 5, at art. 13(1).
155. See Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 455-57 (final report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention).
156. Convention, supra note 5, at art. 5(2), provides as follows:
The enjoyment and exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence
of the protection in the country of origin of the work. Consequently, apart
from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well as
the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be
governed exclusively by the laws of the country whose protection is claimed.
157. Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 454 (quoting WIPO Glossary of the
Terms of the Law of Copyright and Neighboring Rights).
158. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-11 (1982).
159. See 17 U.S.C. §411(a) (1982).
160. 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1982).
161. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982).
162. A mandatory notice requirement was contained in the original U.S. Copyright
Statute. See Act of May 31, 1790, supra note 9.
163. H.R. REP. supra note 6, at 45.
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does not act as a bar to copyright liability, but infringers have employed
the doctrine to reduce damages upon a showing of unintentional (innocent) infringement. 16 4 H.R. 4262, however, clarified that the innocent
infringement doctrine would not be available if a copyright holder had
voluntarily marked the copyrighted work.
The primary controversy over formalities concerned mandatory
copyright registration as a prerequisite to an author's right to seek judicial relief for infringement. Under § 411 (a) of the 1976 Copyright Act,
judicial enforcement of a copyright was not available until an author registered his copyright. 16 5 To the extent that this registration requirement conditions the exercise or enjoyment of a copyright upon a
formality, § 411 (a) is incompatible with Article 5(2) of Berne.
Concluding that mandatory registration was incompatible with
Berne, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that Congress
repeal the § 411(a) registration condition. 1 66 At the same time, however, the Committee strengthened incentives for voluntary registration.
First, the Committee preserved the traditional prima facie evidentiary
value of the certificate of registration, which shifts the burden of proof
in an infringement action from the copyright holder to the alleged
infringer if a work has been registered. 167 Second, to discourage technical copyright violations, the Committee enhanced relief for infringement
168
of copyrighted works by increasing mandated statutory damages.
Third, the Committee retained provisions that shift attorney fees where
69
a copyright holder must defend a registered copyright and prevails.1
The objective of these incentives for voluntary compliance with registration procedures was to encourage copyright holders to continue to seek
registration. This would enable courts to continue to rely on the registration scheme to simplify and otherwise streamline copyright
litigation. 170
The SenateJudiciary Committee proposed to eliminate § 411 (a) to
discourage other nations from imposing onerous formalities on American copyright holders seeking foreign enforcement of their rights. In
retaliation for preconditions to enforcement in U.S. courts, foreign governments could require an American copyright holder to endure lengthy
waiting periods or to translate a work into a foreign language or to comply with other procedural requirements prior to qualifying for copyright
protection. Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee believed that
repealing § 411(a) would preempt potential foreign retaliation by
preventing foreign governments from using American registration
164. Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publishing Co., 807 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir.
1986). See also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1982).
S. REP., supra note 8, at 12-26.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 46. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
S. REP., supra note 8, at 12-26.
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1 71
requirements as a ready pretext.
The House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, on the other
hand, maintained the strict "minimalist" approach. Arguing the distinction between rights and remedies, the House Judiciary Committee contended that registration was not a bar to the substantive rights of
copyright holders, but only a procedural step-like court filing feesnecessary to enter the courthouse.' 7 2 In other words, failure to register,
according to the House Committee, did not cause a "loss of copyrights."
Unregistered foreign copyright holders would continue to enjoy and
exercise their rights in the U.S. Moreover, registration was necessary to
promote efficient litigation practices and to preserve the Library of Con173
gress's ability to acquire new works.

Ironically, this esoteric legal question became the central issue in
negotiations between the House and Senate to reconcile S. 1301 and
H.R. 4262. At the outset of the legislative process, the moral rights
issue loomed as the major threat to Berne Convention ratification, yet in
the latter stages of the process, the formalities issue became the primary
point of debate between the houses. Ultimately, the House and Senate
found a perfect compromise, a middle ground that maintained the spirit
of "minimalism" and the virtues of domestic registration while still
ensuring that no foreign nation would have cause to impose retaliatory
74
formalities on U.S. copyright holders. The compromise provision'
does not repeal § 411 (a) in toto, but still manages to eliminate any formality taint.' 75 The Ad Hoc Working Group on Compliance with the
Berne Convention paved the way for this compromise when it noted in
hearings during the 99th Congress that "Section 411 is . . .not incom-

patible with Berne to the extent that it requires registration of a work of
which the United States is not the country of origin.' 76 In other words,
so long as a foreign copyright holder does not have to comply with the
registration requirement, the United States is free to impose stricter
procedural requirements on its own nationals.
The Implementation Act thus contains a two-tiered registration system.' 7 7 American law still requires United States authors to register a
copyright prior to judicial enforcement of their rights.178 United States
law will not, however, require foreign authors or copyright holders to
register a copyright prior to initiating an infringement action in this
171. Id.
172. H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 41.
173. Id. at 41-42.
174. 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
175. H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 37.
176. Hearings, 99th Cong., supra note 4, at 473.
177. See 134 CONG. REC. S.14553 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement by Senator
DeConcini).
178. S. REP., supra note 8, at 24 ("[E]ven without the gatekeeping function of section 411 (a), the law gives copyright claimants strong disincentives to come to court
without a registration certificate...").
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country. 179 This new provision clearly satisfies Article 5(2) of Berne.
Although the new law imposes harsher registration requirements on
United States citizens than on foreign authors, the Act contains benefits
making registration an attractive option. Moreover, with the enactment
of H.R. 4262, as amended, American law no longer burdens foreign
copyrights with additional formalities. No foreign nation therefore can
justify imposing formalities on American copyright holders who attempt
to enforce their rights abroad.
Conclusion
For years the United States chose to abstain from the important benefits
stemming from membership in the Berne Union. Crescendoing international pressure, increased incidence of piracy, and the realization among
legal scholars that United States law would not require a massive overhaul to comply with Berne encouraged Congress to ratify the Convention. After extensive hearings during the 99th and 100th Congresses,
Congress finally realized that as the world's foremost exporter of copyrighted material, the United States has the most to gain from Berne
membership.
Aside from the benefits that will accrue to the American copyright
industry, ratification of Berne also strengthened United States credibility and bargaining power in the international community. American
negotiators now have a better bargaining position when encouraging
other nations to combat piracy and when attempting to achieve further
international copyright protections at GATT sessions. As Secretary
Verity noted,
all societies ultimately must make a choice: do they wish to be known for
encouraging their citizens to apply their creative talents to the production
of paintings, music, sculpture, cinema, literature, computer software, or
various other works that make our lives so much fuller and richer? Or do
they wish to be known as nations that steal what others create? 180
By ratifying Berne, the United States announced its choice to advance
the progress of literature and the arts internationally by providing substantial copyright protection to authors and artists of all nations.

179. 134 CONG. REc. S.14554 (Joint Explanatory Statement on Amendment to
S. 130 1) ("It thus avoids creating the undesirable precedent that would buttress other
potential or current Berne adherents in arguing that they may impose truly onerous
registration requirements on foreign works, including works of U.S. origin, without

offending Berne standards").
180. Heaings, 100th Cong., supra note 4, at 72.

